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COMMENTARY
PERMANENT LEGISLATION TO CORRECT
DURO V. REINA
Nell Jessup Newton*

Duro v. Reina

In Duro v. Reinal the Supreme Court held that Indian tribal courts
do not have criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians. 2 In so
doing the Court extended its earlier holding in Oliphant v. Suquamish
Indian Tribe,3 which had prevented tribes from exercising criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians and struck a serious blow to tribal sovereignty.4 The Oliphant decision has been soundly criticized as ahistorical and even dishonest,5 as well as essentially ethnocentric. 6 The
case also posed grave dangers to tribal people, because of the great
number of nonmember Indians who live and work on Indian reservations, 7 and the fact that nonmembers fall through the cracks of the
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* Professor of Law, Catholic University Law School. The author wishes to thank

Philip S. Deloria for his contributions to this commentary. The author was involved in
the discussions leading up to the legislation.
1. 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
2. Id. at 682.
3. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
4. Id. at 199.
5. The majority opinion relied on such dubious sources of congressional intent as
unenacted bills. For contemporary criticisms, see, e.g., Russel L. Barsh, The Betrayal:
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe and the Hunting of the Snark, 63 MiNN. L. REv.
609 (1979); Richard Collins, Implied Limitations on the Jurisdiction of Indian Tribes,
54 WASH. L. REv. 479 (1979).
6. Milner Ball has argued that Oliphant is an ethnocentric manipulation of precedent and invention of the doctrine that Indian tribes were somehow miraculously
"incorporated" into the United States. Milner Ball, Constitution, Courts, Indian Tribes,
1987 AM. B. FouND. REs. J. 1, 34-43. Robert Williams has argued that the Oliphant
doctrine requires tribes to adopt a "legal self-genocide" by accommodating tribal
differences to the legal norms of the dominant society in order to be permitted to retain
any quantpm of self-government. Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra of Federal
Indian Law - the Hard Trail of Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man's
Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 Wis. L. REv. 219, 274, 288.
7. Many reservation Bureau of Indian Affairs and Indian Health Service employees
are members of other tribes. In addition the need to leave the reservations for schooling
and employment has resulted in many marriages of Indian people of different tribes.
For an explanation of these and other factors creating large numbers of nonmember
Indians on today's Indian reservations, see Miller v. Crow Creek Sioux Tribe, 12 Indian
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federal criminal jurisdiction scheme that applies to Indians committing
crimes on reservations.8 Consequently, tribes were helpless to take
anything but the most limited action against nonmembers committing
misdemeanors on reservations.
During the summer after Duro was decided, many Indian tribal
officials met to discuss the case and determine both short-term and
long-term courses of action. For example, the Southwest Intertribal
Court of Appeals held a day-long conference for judges at the American Indian Law Center at which tribal attorneys, tribal judges, law
professors, and the Law Center staff debated possible solutions to
Duro. 9 Tribes universally condemned the decision in Duro and the
Western Governors Association adopted a resolution urging Congress
to study the problem.' 0 The states of Arizona, Montana, Nevada,
North Dakota, and South Dakota passed resolutions urging Congress
to act as well."
Some groups supported the Duro decision, however. For example,
the 'Conference of Western Attorneys General adopted a resolution
urging Congress to grant the states authority over minor crimes committed on reservations.' 2 Those who favored the opinion argued that
tribal court systems are not subject to the Bill of Rights. Although
this point is true, the fact is that all persons detained under tribal
authority may bring a writ of habeas corpus to the federal courts for
L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 6008, 6009-10 (Intertribal Ct. App., Mar.
22, 1984) (upholding tribal court jurisdiction over Sioux from one tribe prosecuted by
tribal court of another tribe). In addition to members of other tribes, many Indians are
not enrolled anywhere, although they are racially and culturally Indian. Some, like the
Martinez children in the famous case of Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49
(1978), are ineligible for enrollment in either the mother's or the father's tribe. Others,
like some traditional Hopis, refuse to enroll in the Indian Reorganization Act tribe for
political and religious reasons. If the concept of "member" of an Indian tribe necessitates
enrollment, these people would not be subject to tribal court jurisdiction.
8. Nonmember Indians, like all Indians, can be prosecuted for committing one of
the 13 major crimes. Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1988). But the jurisdictional
scheme existing at the time of the decision did not vest criminal jurisdiction in either
the states (other than Public-Law 280 states) or the federal government over crimes
commtted by nonmembers. See generally Robert M. Clinton, CriminalJurisdictionover
Indian Lands: A Journey Through a JurisdictionalMaze, 18 Am. L. REv. 503 (1976).
9. For a contemporaneous description of some of the proposed solutiovs, see Nell
J. Newton, Responses to Duro v. Reina, AM. INDLN L. NnwsL., (American Indian
Law Center, Albuquerque, N.M.), Aug. 1990, at 1 (vol. 23, no. 1).
10. Western Governors Association, Resolution 90-014 (July 17, 1990), in House
Comm. on Interior & Insular Affairs, Hearing of Apr. 11, 1991, on H.R. 972, 102d
Cong., 2d Sess. 215 (1991) (serial no. 102-4).
11. Also, a resolution was before the New Mexico legislature when it adjourned.
In addition, 70 legislators from Oregon signed a letter to the Senate Select Committee
urging passage of permanent legislation. S. REP. No. 168, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. 47
(1991).
12. Conference of Western Attorneys Gen., Resolution 90-01 (Aug. 3, 1990) (on
file with author).
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review of civil rights violations," and this was the very route Duro
took to get his case before the Supreme Court.' 4 In short, all those
concerned about keeping order on Indian reservations agreed on the
need for immediate action by Congress; on the other hand, not all
agreed on what should be done for the long term. In the fall of 1990
Congress enacted temporary legislation to address the problems created
by Duro, by means of a rider to an appropriations act, amending the
definition sections of the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA).1 s In response
to some of the above concerns about tribal court procedures, a sunset
provision was added during the conference on the bill, providing for
a cutoff date of September 30, 1991.
Both the use of an appropriations rider and the language of the
statute deserve further explanation. The Senate Select Committee on
Indian Affairs used a rider on an existing bill rather than introducing
completely new legislation, for reasons of speed and efficiency as well
as politics. The chair of the Senate Select Committee, Senator Daniel
K. Inouye, is also the chair of Defense Appropriations Subcommittee,
and thus had a certain amount of influence in the appropriations
process.
The mechanism used, amending a definition section of the ICRA
instead of enacting a new substantive law, requires a fuller explanation.
Congress chose this mechanism to correct the Supreme Court's misinterpretation of congressional intent, instead of creating new legal
rights or imposing new legal burdens. This distinction may seem
artificial, but the Supreme Court had carefully distinguished between
limitations on congressional power and limitations on tribal power
beginning with cases as early as Talton v. Mayes.16 In Talton, the
Court held that the Bill of Rights did not apply to curb action by
tribes because tribes are not component structures in the constitutional
scheme.' 7 Congress had enacted the ICRA, the statute amended by the
Duro-correction legislation, in order to impose some of the basic
principles of the Bill of Rights on Indian tribal governments. The
ICRA struck a balance between assuring fundamental fairness in tribal
13. See 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (1988) ("The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall
be available to any person, in a court of the United States, to test the legality of his
detention by order of an Indian tribe.").
14. After the tragic death of a 14-year-old boy shot during a fight on the reservation,
the Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Tribe arrested Duro, a member of a California
Indian tribe, for discharging a firearm after a federal indictment for murder arising out
of the same incident had been dismissed. Duro subsequently petitioned for habeas corpus
pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 1303. See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 681-82 (1990).
15. Act of Nov. 5, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-511, § 8077(d), 104 Stat. 1893 (codified
as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1988)).
16. 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
17. Id. at 382.
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government operations and protecting tribal sovereignty. As a result,
the ICRA requires tribes to permit defendants to retain attorneys, but
it does not impose the financial burden on tribes to pay for attorneys. 8
With this background in mind, the reason the mechanism of amending the definition section of the ICRA was used, instead of the
mechanism of creating new law, comes into clearer focus. Everyone
assumes Congress could have created new law by delegating federal
power to tribes to try nonmember Indians.19 This mechanism carries
with it conceptual and practical difficulties. The concept of delegation
connotes giving to someone something that person does not already
have. Thus, a delegation may appear to be conceding that tribes have
no such jurisdiction - a concession Congress did not wish to make.
Furthermore, if the delegatee has no power in a particular area, the
delegatee exercises the power of the person doing the delegation. In
other words, a delegation could be viewed as a concession that tribes
would be exercising federal power, subject to the full panoply of rights
protected by the Bill of Rights, instead of tribal power. Indian tribes
apply the principles of fundamental fairness embodied in the Bill of
Rights in their tribal courts. Nevertheless, imposing on Indian tribes
all cif the rules that have been developed in federal and state courts,
in cases interpreting the Bill of Rights, would go far to making tribal
courts merely adjuncts of the federal courts. This interpretation would
hamper the tribal courts' ability to chart their own courses toward
just resolution of conflicts without having to be subject to all the
procedural protections of Anglo-American law.
In short, although a delegation would have solved a practical consequence of the Duro decision by ensuring that tribal courts could
exercise authority over nonmember Indians, it would not have reversed
the holding in the Duro case on the extent of tribal authority. It was
the latter as well as the former that Congress wished to achieve.
Congress thus chose to correct the Court's misreading of congressional
intent, and, in a sense, overturn Duro. The Conference Committee
Report states Congress's view of the powers of Indian tribes quite
clearly: "Throughout the history of this country, the Congress has
never questioned the power of tribal courts to exercise misdemeanor
jurisdiction over nontribal member Indians in the same manner that
' 20
such courts exercise misdemeanor jurisdiction over tribal members."
Of course, if Duro had been a constitutional decision, Congress's
113.
The pertinent part reads: "No Indian tribe shall ... deny to any person in a
criminal proceeding the right ... at his own expense to have the assistance of counsel
for his defense." 25 U.S.C. § 1302(6).
19. See United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975) (upholding congressional

delegation of commerce power to bar introduction of alcohol into Indian Country to
Indian tribes).
20. H.R. REP. No. 938, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 133 (1990).
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ability to overturn it would be greatly limited, for the Supreme Court
is the final arbiter of what the Constitution means. 2' In other words,
if the Court held that the Constitution somehow prevents tribes from
having jurisdiction over nonmembers, then Congress could do little to
change this result.
The good news is that the Court appeared to base its decision on
federal common law, law the federal courts legitimately create in order
to decide a case to further congressional goals in the absence of a
clear statutory rule to apply.n In this endeavor courts are in fact trying
to ascertain congressional intent. This analysis was the basis of the
Oliphant23 decision and of Duro, as Philip S. Deloria and I have
argued elsewhere. 24 If the Court errs in determining congressional
intent, Congress can then correct the Court.
For these reasons Congress chose an existing statute dealing with
tribal governments and applying to tribal courts, and amended the
definition section to make clear to the federal courts that Congress
recognizes tribal court jurisdiction is broad enough to include nonmember Indians. As amended, the ICRA definition section reads as
follows (the new language is in italics):
25 U.S.C. § 1301. Definitions
For purposes of this title [the ICRA], the term
(1) "Indian tribe" means any tribe, band, or other group
of Indians subject to the jurisdiction of the United States
and recognized as possessing powers of self-government;
(2) "powers of self-government" means and includes all
governmental powers possessed by an Indian tribe, executive, legislative, and judicial, and all offices, bodies, and
tribunals by and through which they are executed, including
courts of Indian offenses; and including the inherent power
of an Indian tribe, hereby recognized and affirmed, to
exercise criminaljurisdiction over all Indians;
(3) "Indian court" means any Indian tribal court or court
of Indian offense; and
(4) "Indian" means any person who would be subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States as an Indian under
section 1153, title 18, United States Code, if that person
21. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966). Compare Marbury v. Madison,
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).

22. See generally Martha Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common
Law, 99 HAzv. L. REv. 881 (1986).
23. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (tribal courts have
no criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians).
24. See Philip S. Deloria & Nell J. Newton, The Criminal Jurisdiction of Tribal
Courts over Non-Member Indians, FED. B. NEWS & J., Mar. 1991, at 70.
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were to commit an offense listed in that section in Indian
country to which that section applies.2
During the year within which the amendment was effective, 26 several
different bills were introduced to make the legislation permanent. 27 As
time passed it became apparent there was agreement among tribes and
tribal advocates that Congress should continue the approach of recognizing inherent power rather than creating new power for tribes.
Disagreement among those supporting a permanent correction arose
mainly in whether such a correction should be part of a more comprehensive tribal courts improvement or tribal courts enhancement bill.
Several draft bills were circulated designed to deal more comprehensively with tribal court problems by providing for funding and training.28 Although these bills contained some good, strong language about
the role of tribal courts and the importance of increased funding for
tribal courts, other provisions, such-as the creation of new mechanisms
to determine standards to be applied to tribal courts, were more
complicated, more controversial, and in need of much closer study.
Congressman Bill Richardson introduced a bill in the House, House
Bill 972, that was simplicity itself: "Section 8077 of Public Law 101511 (104 Stat. 1891) is amended by striking out subsection (d)." 29 In
other words, the bill made the earlier correction permanent by removing the sunset provision. After hearings in April 1991,30 the bill passed
the House by a unanimous vote on September 25, 1991.
The legislative path was not as clear through the Senate, however.31
Senator Inouye introduced essentially the same bill, Senate Bill 962,
and a similar, though somewhat fancier version, Senate Bill 963,32 in
25. Italicized language is quoted from the Defense Appropriations Act for FY 91,
Pub. L. No. 101-511, § 8077, 104 Stat. 1856, 1892 (1990) (amending 25 U.S.C. § 1301
(1988)).

26. As stated above, Congress agreed to the inclusion of a sunset provision, limiting
the amendment's effect to the year ending September 30, 1991. The effect of this
amendment, in my opinion, could not be to make Congress's vision of tribal sovereignty
automatically evaporate upon the expiration of the period, but only to signal to a
reviewing court that the issue had entered into a phase of serious reconsideration on

the cut-off date. In other words, the amerldment would no longer be a legitimate source
of the current state of congressional policy regarding tribal sovereignty, requiring a
reviewing source to consult other sources of congressional intent.
27. S. 962, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); Indian Tribal Justice Recognition Act of
1991, 3. 963, 102d Cong., Ist Sess.; H.R. 972, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
28. One of these bills was introduced. See The Tribal Judicial Enhancement Act
of 1991, S.667, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
29. H.R. 972, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1 (1991).
3G. CriminalMisdemeanor Jurisdictionin Indian Country: Hearing on the Duro
Decision, Before the House Comm. on Interior & InsularAffairs, House of Rep. 102d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1991) (serial no. 1024).
31. S.962, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
32. Indian Tribal Justice Recognition Act of 1991, S.963, 102d Cong., IstSess.
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the Senate. The major difference was that Senate Bill 963 contained
what is known as "Declarations and Findings," language that does
not have any technical legal effect but is designed to provide a policy
backdrop for those who are reading the legislation. In this provision
the bill reaffirmed the government-to-government relationship, Congress's confidence in tribal courts as justice-administering courts, some
history of Duro, and Congress's belief that tribal courts ought to be
funded on the same level as courts of similar size in the state court
systems. 33 For example, one of the findings stated: "(9) Despite the
Supreme Court's ruling in [Duro], the Congress has never acted to
explicitly divest tribal governments of their inherent authority to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians on their reservations. '"3
After hearings in May and June 1991, 3" the Senate Select Committee
36
marked up the House version, House Bill 972, in September 1991.
Senators John McCain of Arizona, Pete Domenici of New Mexico,
Paul Simon of Illinois, and Paul Wellstone of Minnesota strongly
supported the bill. Senator Tom Daschie of South Dakota expressed
his belief that the Constitution's Bill of Rights should apply to all
nonmember Indians, especially because nonmembers cannot vote in
tribal elections or run for office. Senator Slade Gorton of Washington
had been the biggest critic at the hearings of the plans to correct Duro.
At the hearings held in May, Gorton lost no opportunity to remind
the audience that he argued Oliphant in the Supreme Court, for
example. Senator Gorton argued that Oliphant and Duro were constitutional decisions that cannot be changed by Congress. He also stated
his belief that tribal court judgments should be reviewable in federal
courts.37 As the result of a behind-the-scenes compromise, the Senate
committee added an amendment to the Richardson Bill, House Bill
972, to provide for another temporary two-year extension, instead of
the permanment extension that passed the House. The amendment was
added in order to ensure quick legislative action before the original
bill expired.
The reason timing was so important was because the markup came
late in the legislative session when other serious issues, such as the
Clarence Thomas hearings and the savings and loan crisis, could be
33. Id. § 2.

34. Id. § 2, at 3. Alas, this bill did not contain a provision for any more funding,
just the statement that it was important.
35. Impact of Supreme Court'sRuling in Duro v. Reina, Hearing Before the Select
Comm. on Indian Affairs, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pts. 1 & 2 (1991) [hereinafter Senate
Duro Hearings].
36. At a markup, the senators on the committee debate and discuss the bill with
their staff, agree to changes if necessary and vote. This report is based on my own

observations at the markup.
37. Senate Duro Hearings, supra note 35, pt. 1, at 21-22.
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expected to command more attention from Congress. In such a setting
there was no chance the bill would even make it to the floor unless
the Committee was able to get the bill on the unanimous consent
calendar. When legislation is placed on this calendar, as most of it is,
enactment is a quick formality, with no debate. Since even one senator
may put a "hold' on a bill, preventing it from going on the unanimous
consent calendar, this very fact often defeats a bill. To get a Senator
to release a hold requires political acumen and the art of compromise.
Senator Gorton and several other Senators had put, or were prepared
to put, holds on the bill. With floor time at a premium, the act of
convincing the Senate Majority and Minority Leaders, Senators Mitchell and Dole, respectively, Senate, Senator Mitchell, to give the Chairman of the Committee time on the floor would no doubt require
calling in quite a few legislative chits and risk a filibuster by the
opposition. 8 Thus, the Chairman agreed to a two-year extension and
also promised Senator Gorton that the committee would hold hearings
if Senator Gorton wished to introduce a bill providing for federal
court review of Indian civil rights cases.3 9 With the two-year sunset
clause, House Bill 972 then passed the Senate on the unanimous consent
calendar.
The next step was a conference committee between the House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee and the Senate Select Committee
on Indian Affairs. The senators who had agreed to the amendment
making the legislation temporary in order to obtain Senator Gorton's
agreement not to block the bill felt bound to honor their agreement.
Thus, they refused to recede to the House's original permanent legislation at the conference. Although the senators may have expected the
House members to recede to the temporary legislation, the House
committee members, especially Rep. Miller of California and Rep.
Richardson of New Mexico, hung tough - they would only agree to
a permanent resolution and refused to accept the two-year sunset
clause. Having reached an impasse, the conference committee adjourned. Unfortunately, the date for the expiration of the 1990 temporary Duro legislation passed on September 30, 1991. 40
The adage, "Legislation is like sausage - you may like the end
product, but you may not want to know how it is made," is oftrepeated in law school courses. And the Duro-correction legislation is
no exception. What followed were some behind-the-scenes politicking,
313. Admittedly, a filibuster would seem to be a rather remote risk, given the

urgency of the other issues before the Senate at the time.
39. The hearing on this issue was held on November 20, 1991. Federal Court
Review of Tribal Court Rulings in Actions Arising Under the IRCA and Draft Bill to

Grant Jurisdictionto FederalCourts to Hear FinalActions from Indian Tribal Courts,
Before the Select Comm. for Indian Affairs, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
40. S. REP. No. 168, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1991).
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an avalanche of telegrams from tribes expressing outrage and concern
about the passing of the deadline and the need for a permanent
solution.
Whether in response to the last-minute lobbying by tribes and their
representatives, the tough stand taken by the House, or both, the
Senate Select Committee leadership decided to markup Senate Bill 962,
the Senate version which was the same as House Bill 972. In fact, the
only difference between the two bills was the fact that certain promises
had been made during the markup of House Bill 972 that arguably
did not apply to Senate Bill 972. Perhaps the Chairman was particularly
eloquent, or perhaps Senator Gorton decided that he could not win if
the bill reached the floor. For whatever reasons, Senator Gorton
released the Senators who had made a commitment concerning the
two-year sunset clause to him (Senators Domenici, McCain, and Inouye). After markup, Senate Bill 962 was placed on the unanimous
consent calendar and passed the Senate on October 2, 1991. With two
bills having passed the Senate, House Bill 972 as amended, and Senate
Bill 962, and one having passed the House, original House Bill 972,
the Conference Committee was resumed. Senator Inouye and three
house members attended. Senator Inouye formally asked his House
colleagues to recede to the Senate version one more time. They just
as formally refused, and the Senate receded to 1 the House, thus re4
storing the bill to its original permanent status.
Two weeks after the temporary Duro-correction expired, the Senate
enacted the permanent solution, and the President signed it into law
on October 28, 1991.42
But the Indian law community has not heard the last of this issue,
for the law is surely to be challenged and reviewed by the federal
courts. In particular, opponents can be expected to argue that the law
is only effective as delegated federal power, bringing with it the full
panoply of Bill of Rights protections. Moreover, the issue whether
federal court review of tribal court judgments is necessary is before
the Senate and can be expected to arise repeatedly. In the remainder
of this article, I will address four issues that can be expected to
dominate the discussion of the constitutionality and wisdom of the
law. The rest of this article analyzes these issues: (1) the interpretive
issue: whether the law effectively corrected the Court's misinterpretation of congressional intent; (2) whether the Bill of Rights must be
applied to tribal courts; (3) whether distinguishing between member
and nonmember Indians violates the equal protection principle; (4)
whether it is fair for tribes to exercise jurisdiction over nonmembers
who cannot vote in tribal elections.
41. At this point the big guys left, and the staffers put together the report.
42. Act of Oct. 28, 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-137, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1992

118

AMERICAN INDIAN LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 17

Constitutionaland Statutory Analysis of the
Duro-Correction- Delegation v. Correction?
As discussed above, great concern was raised that whatever solution
Congress adopted be a correction and not a delegation. Recall that
the amendment is very simple, because it merely removed the one-year
sunset clause from the temporary bill. The amendment's title states it
is a bill "to make permanent the legislative reinstatement, following
the decision in [Duro] of the power of Indian tribes to exercise criminal
jurisdiction over Indians." 43 If Congress is in fact "reinstating" tribal
power, could it not be argued that Congress is "granting" back to
tribes something taken away? At best the law is ambiguous, but
members of the Court will look to legislative history to clarify ambiguities.
Certainly there are ample sources of legislative history on this particular bill, with three hearings before two Houses, and numerous
reports. Since the amendment merely removes the sunset clause of the
previous amendment, the best evidence of congressional intent is the
legislative history of the original amendment, which was discussed
above. The arguments originally made in the Conference Committee
report on the original amendment have been incorporated into the
various reports on the latest version, however, including the Conference
Committee report. The report also contains very strong language stating that the purpose of the law is to correct the Court instead of
granting new power:
This legislation clarifies and reaffirms the inherent authority of tribal governments to exercise criminal jurisdiction
over all Indians on their reservations. The Committee of
Conference is clarifying an inherent right which tribal governments have always held and was never questioned until
the recent Supreme Court decision of Duro v. Reina [495
U.S. 676 (1990)]. The Congressional power to correct the
Court's misinterpretation is manifest as is its plenary power
over Indian tribes which derives from the Constitution.
The Committee of the Conference asserts that the Congressional power over Indian tribes allows this recognition
of the inherent right of tribal governments to retain this
jurisdiction and notes that two fundamental maxims of
Indian law come into play in this legislation. First, as Justice
Kennedy stated in the Duro decision, Congress determines
Indian policy. Second, Indian tribes retain all rights and
powers not expressly divested by Congress.[ ] These prin43. H.R. 972, 102d Cong., IstSess. 1 (1991).
44. This statement is not entirely correct in light of the Court's holding in Oliphant.
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ciples go back to the decisions of Chief Justice John Marshall and are part of the foundation of the federal tribal
relation. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515
4
(1832). 5
The other reports, though typically given less weight in the interpretive process, contain similar language. The House Committee report
essentially states the same thing as the Conference Committee report
and incorporates language from the Conference Committee report on
the temporary amendment, quoted above. 46
The Senate report also contains strong language regarding the inherent status of tribal power:
From the perspective of most Indian legal scholars and
virtually all tribal leaders, the prevailing view is that if
Congress had intended to divest Indian tribal governments
of jurisdiction over non-Indians, it would have explicitly
done so. Instead, the assumption in Congress has always
been that tribal governments do have such jurisdiction, and
Federal statutes reflect this view. 47
In sum, it is hard to see how the Court could with any honesty
interpret the law as a delegation to the tribes rather than a reaffirmation of a power that tribes already have. This interpretation does
not necessarily mean, however, that the Court will uphold the bill.
The Court's answers to questions raised below may impel it to find a
constitutional basis for overturning the legislation.
ConstitutionalQuestions
Application of the Bill of Rights
How should the dominant society judge tribal courts? Often when
discussing this subject with outsiders, it seems that they think that
tribes do not want to be subjected to the Bill of Rights because they
want full rein to mistreat and abuse those who come before them.
What is the argument for leaving tribes free of the Bill of Rights? A
reflection about the origins of the Bill of Rights and why it was
imposed upon the states can help tribal advocates counter these concerns by comparing states and tribal governments.
As noted, one of the most often-voiced concerns about tribal courts
is that they should be subjected to the full array of constitutional
45. COMM.

OF THE CONFERENCE, JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT,

H.R. 972, H.R.

REP. No. 261, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
46. See H.R. REP. No. 61, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1991) (quoting H.R. REP. No.
938, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 133 (1990)).
47. S. R P. No. 168, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1991).
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protections, usually meaning the same protections that are applied to
defendants in state criminal proceedings. Everyone summoned before
a tribal court, whether or not she is a tribal member, is presently
entitled to fundamental fairness in accordance with the protections of
the ICRA. The ICRA represents a congressional accommodation between the imposition on Indian tribal governments of every specific
guarantee of the Bill of Rights as that document has been interpreted
in cases arising from state and federal courts and the more basic norm
that each person has a right to be treated with fundamental fairness
in the criminal process. By imposing statutory obligations to ensure
fundamental fairness without imposing every provision of the Bill of
Rights "jot for jot" on tribes, the Congress chose to strike the
appropriate balance.
Assuming that fundamental fairness requires imposing every constitutional provision that binds the federal or state governments on tribal
governments ignores constitutional history and the rich debates in the
Supreme Court cases over the core meaning of the Due Process Clause,
through which most, but not all, of the guarantees binding the federal
government have been applied to the states. 4 The criminal process
provisions of the Bill of Rights did not apply to the states automatically, but were placed in the Constitution as bulwarks against excesses
of federal power. 49 Nearly one hundred years after the Fourteenth
Amendment was enacted, the Supreme Court determined that the
concept of fundamental fairness of the Due Process Clause incorporated certain provisions of the Bill of Rights to the states. 50
These selective incorporation cases represented a judicial trade-off:
the Court was reluctant to interpret the concept of due process too
broadly, as encompassing any procedures and rights that might be
necessary to accord fundamental fairness, because of concerns that the
concept would then become so subjective as to permit judges to impose
their own concepts of fairness on the states. On the other hand, if
the Court were to interpret the Due Process Clause as having been
intended by the framers of the post-Civil War amendments to incorporate the entire Bill of Rights to the states, the resulting "total
incorporation" would shackle the states with guarantees, such as the
right to a jury trial in civil cases in which the amount of controversy
48. This debate is called the "Palko-Adamson"

debate after the cases containing

well-respected defenses of selective incorporation. Compare Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 3119 (1937) (Cardozo, J.) (refusing to incorporate the double jeopardy clause as

not implicit in the concept of ordered liberty), overruled in Benton v. Maryland, 395
U.S. 784 (1969), with Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947) (refusing to incorporate
the fifth amendment self-incrimination provision on the same grounds), overruled in
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
49. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
50. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (collecting cases).
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is over twenty dollars as well as the grand jury provision. These
guarantees would impose great additional costs on the states and
interfere with the states' roles as laboratories to develop innovative
criminal procedures without providing any concomitant gain to the

criminal defendant.'
Thus, the Court compromised by adopting the "selective incorporation" doctrine. This doctrine reined in judicial tendencies to give
too much subjective meaning to the concept of due process by restricting judges to the language of the Bill of Rights provisions that had
been incorporated by the states. On the other hand, only those provisions that were regarded as fundamental would be incorporated,
leaving the states free from the requirement of those provisions not
regarded as fundamental. 51
The cases in which the Court applied the selective incorporation
doctrine provide valuable insights into both the importance of these
clauses in the American scheme of justice and the content that the
Court has given to the concept of "fundamental fairness." In these
cases the Court accommodated the interests of the individual with the
unique role of the states as separate sovereigns in the federal system.
In so doing the Court focused not on fundamental fairness as some
abstract concept but as a concept rooted in the reality of the procedures
of the fifty states as they actually administered their justice systems.
In fact, the Court candidly admitted in Duncan v. Louisiana12 that
the standard it applied to the state courts was whether the particular
constitutional provision was "necessary to an Anglo-American regime
of ordered liberty." 53
As the Supreme Court engaged in this inquiry in determining what
provisions of the Bill of Rights to apply to the states, so did Congress
in deciding which provisions had to be applied to Indian tribes.
Obviously Congress rejected the notion that only total incorporation
was fair or even sufficient, for Congress applied a stricter 'standard to
tribal courts than it does to state courts in the case of criminal jury
trials for petty offenses punishable by less than six months in jail.5 4
Tribal court defendants have a right to jury trial no matter what the
classification of the crime. Apart from this one example of Congress
imposing a greater obligation on tribal governments, the ICRA applied
every other provision in the Bill of Rights relating to criminal procedure
except two: the Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the
51. See generally Jerold H. Israel, Selective IncorporationRevisited, 71 GEo. L.J.
253 (1982).
52. 391 U.S. 145, reh'g denied, 392 U.S. 947 (1968).
53. Id. at 149-50 n.14.
54. Id. at 145.
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right to an appointed counsel, held to be within the Sixth Amendment's
guarantee of the right to counsel."
Neither of these guarantees is necessary to accord criminal defendants fundamental fairness in the tribal criminal process. The Grand
Jury Clause has been held not to be applicable to the states.56 Moreover, even in federal court, that clause applies by its terms only to
prosecutions for felonies.57 Although Hurtado v. California5 was decided before the Court began to incorporate specific guarantees of the
Bill of Rights to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, most
commentators have concluded that the Grand Jury Clause is not
essential to a fair system of criminal law.5 9 There is little objection
concerning a lack of indictment by grand jury in tribal courts. As a
consequence, there seems to be no reason in law or policy for Congress
to impose such a requirement on tribal courts, whose caseloads are
comprised almost completely of misdemeanors.
In fact, the main concern of those who criticize tribal courts is the
fact that tribal justice systems are not required to provide appointed
counsel for indigents - a requirement of the Sixth Amendment found
fully applicable to the states in Argersinger v. Hamlin.60 The answer
to those who advocate imposing a right to appointed counsel is not
to deny the importance of the right to counsel in state and federal
court proceedings, but to explore the reasons the guarantee was applied
to the states and compare the states' procedures at that time with
those of tribes.
Such a comparison indicates that the Court determined that the right
to counsel should be extended to misdemeanors that actually resulted
in jail sentences because of two facts that are absent from the tribal
court systems. First, that the state was represented by attorneys while
the defendant was not. 6' This circumstance is not the case in tribal
courts, in which it is still the norm that judges and prosecutors are
not law-trained attorneys. Second, the Court was very concerned about
plea bargaining and the resulting "assembly line justice. '62 In big city
courts with crowded dockets, defendants were prevailed upon to plea
bargain in order to dispose of cases as expeditiously as possible. The
pressure to bargain was most pronounced in the case of misdemeanors,
according to the Court. Accordingly, the Court decided that requiring
55. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
56. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
57. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
58. Id.
59. See, eg., VAYNE R. LAFAvE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CIMINAL PROCEDURE §
2.6, at 57 (1985).
60. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
61. Id. at 26.
62. Id. at 35.
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a state-appointed attorney would serve to ensure that defendants did
not plead guilty to lesser offenses when it was not in their best interests
to do so.63 While plea bargaining is endemic in state court systems,
the practice is practically nonexistent in tribal court systems. Thus, the
right of appointed counsel for misdemeanors is not as fundamental to
a fair scheme of tribal justice.
This history is important, because the analysis used to apply these
guarantees to state court proceedings, while essentially sound, has
absolutely nothing to do with tribal courts. Tribal courts do not trace
their roots to the English common law as do state courts. Tribal courts
are not part of an "Anglo-American regime of ordered justice."
Nevertheless, tribal courts are justice-administering courts that trace
their roots to a nonadversary system of justice, while struggling to
chart their own course by melding those aspects of the Anglo-American
system the dominant society has imposed upon them with Indian
traditions of listening and judging.
In conclusion, neither of the provisions omitted from the ICRA is
necessary to fundamental fairness in the tribal criminal justice system.
The Equal Protection Argument
Senator Gorton has argued that exercise of jurisdiction by a tribal
government over a nonmember Indian, but not a non-Indian, would
violate equal protection as an impermissible racial distinction.6" He is
wrong. Tribes are not constrained by the Constitution.65 Tribes are
constrained by the equal protection principle of the ICRA, however.
Even if we interpret that statutory injunction as having the same
meaning as the constitutional provision, it is not impermissible racial
discrimination for the federal government to subject Indians to federal
criminal jurisdiction. Tribal courts should be able to make such distinctions in their criminal schemes.
The judicially-developed definition of "Indian" for purposes of the
Major Crimes Act has a racial component. While some quantum of
Indian blood is always necessary for a person to be classed as an
"Indian" for purposes of the Major Crimes Act,6 a person who is a
full-blooded Indian racially may nevertheless not be regarded as an
Indian subject to the federal jurisdiction. The most often-used example
refers to members of terminated tribes. Because the government has
terminated the political relationship with the person's tribe, that person
is no longer subject to federal criminal jurisdiction as an Indian. Not
63. Id. at 31.
64. Senate Duro Hearings, supra note 35, pt. 1, at 22 (statement of Sen. Slade

Gorton).
65. Talton, 163 U.S. at 376.
66. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1988).
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every use of the term "Indian" in any given federal law should be
treated ipso facto as a political classification, but should be scrutinized
to ensure that the classification is not actually motivated by racial
animus. 67 The Supreme Court originally interpreted the term "Indian"
in the federal criminal statutes as a strictly racial term,s but that case
was decided at the time the government was actively trying to destroy
Indian tribes as political units. In the twentieth century the federal
courts have quite properly interpreted the term as requiring identification in the community as an Indian - not in the narrow sense of
being an enrolled tribal member, but in the broader sense of being
69
the member of a tribal community.
Moreover, I cannot help point out the following irony: if any event
has forced Indian tribes to accord separate treatment to some Indians
as opposed to all non-Indians, it has not been the tribes' decision.
Tribal officials do not seek to overturn Oliphant, not because they do
not wish to exercise criminal misdemeanor jurisdiction over non-Indians, but because they are sufficiently pragmatic to accept that the
white majority in this country will never countenance the return to
tribes of jurisdiction over non-Indians. Nevertheless, before Oliphant
tribes had the opportunity to treat exactly the same all defendants
charged with misdemeanors of whatever race. It was the judicial
branch's action that resulted in the present system.
Extension of the Franchise to Nonmember Indians
As completely strange as it must seem to most tribal people, some
have argued that Congress should require tribes to extend the franchise
to nonmember Indians as a condition of tribal court criminal jurisdiction over them. This question can only intelligently be analyzed by
distinguishing between two important categories of nonmembers: resident nonmembers and nonresident (or transient) nonmembers.
Let us start with the easiest case: nonresident, transient nonmembers,
illustrated by the often-cited example of the person of Cherokee lineage
who just happens to drive through Toppenish, Washington, home of
the Yakima tribe, and is arrested on probable cause for alleged commission of a misdemeanor. No state government would have to extend
citizenship to this person in order to exercise criminal jurisdiction over
him; neither should any tribal government. The fact that this person
67. Nell J. Newton, FederalPower Over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 132 U. PENN. L. REv. 195 (1984).
68. United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567 (1846).
69. See, e.g., St. Cloud v. United States, 702 F. Supp. 1456 (D.S.D. 1988) (noting
social recognition as an Indian and enjoying the benefits of tribal affiliation are sufficient
to bring a person under the federal statutes); see also S. REP. No. 168, 102d Cong.,
1st Sess., app. C at 48 (1991) (analysis by American Law Division of the Library of
Congress of the meaning of the term "Indian" for purposes of federal jurisdiction).
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could decide to move to Washington, establish residency, and thus
vote in state elections is beside the point: by definition he has not
done so. Objecting that this person will not be subject to the Bill of
Rights in exactly the same fashion as those constitutional provisions
have been interpreted to apply to state governments is at least an
objection that makes some sense. The argument that the reason is that
as a transient he is not eligible to vote in tribal elections is completely
without merit.
The second category is more difficult: nonmembers who reside on
the reservation, yet are not able to participate in the tribal political
process by voting or running for office. Again, the example is given
of the famous Cherokee who lives in Toppenish, Washington. This
person would not necessarily be subject to tribal criminal jurisdiction,
of course, unless he was recognized in the community as an Indian.
If he was, he would be subject to tribal jurisdiction.
The concern expressed by Senator Daschle is thiat such people should
have the right of all Americans to choose a new domicile and then
participate in the political life of the new domicile. To use a stark
example from recent history, if a bunch of Rajneeshee religious adherents move to Antelope, Oregon, nothing can prevent them from
registering to vote and overtaking the town.
Indian tribes should not be different. The problem with this reasoning is that Indian tribes are different. The United States government's
decision to permit tribal governments to exist as quasi-independent
sovereigns is a decision not to dictate to them who may share in their
political life. States share fully in the political life of the nation, but
states are the constituent parts of the nation. By entering into the
constitutional compact, states surrendered rights and immunities. The
Interstate Commerce Clause ° has provided Congress with the power
to build a national economy; it has also been invoked by the Court
to protect the national economy from the parochialism of narrow state
interests."
Contrast the role of Indian tribes in the constitutional system. Indian
tribes were not part of the constitutional plan, as the Court just
reiterated last term. 72 Nevertheless, the United States has become a
model for other nations by recognizing Indian tribes' continued right
to exist as separate entities. In fact, while the Interstate Commerce
Clause has properly functioned to unite the states into one nation, the
70. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
71. See, e.g., Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981);
Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511 (1935).

72. "JIl]t would be absurd to suggest that the tribes surrendered immunity in a
convention to which they were not even parties." Blatchford v. Native Village of
Noatak, ll S. Ct. 2578, 2583 (1991).
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Indian Commerce Clause73 has properly and consistently functioned as
a method to protect Indian tribes from outsiders, beginning with the
first Trade and Intercourse Act, passed in 1790.74 To begin at this
point to dictate to tribal governments 75 who may partake in their
political communities would be a breach of faith with Indian tribes
unprecedented since the Dawes Act of the 1880s; 76 a breach of treaty

promises with many tribes; and a violation of developing standards of
international law." On a purely practical basis, no tribe would accept
such a condition. As a result, the law enforcement problems on
reservations, the major concern of this bill, would continue to go
unremedied.
Although requiring participation by nonmembers would accord nonmembers voice in tribal governments, it is important to note that
although some nonmembers who do not reside on reservations have
complained about this bill, to my knowledge very few nonmember
residents have so complained. Sam Deloria's testimony before the
Senate gives one reason:
[Although enrolled at Standing Rock] I felt that my political
power at Pine Ridge and at Sisseton when I lived there was
greater than the political power that I feel as a resident of
Albuquerque, New Mexico [because] it was a small community. A community where people took some pains to see
that my rights were protected and it was also a community
that felt itself politically threatened. They knew that if
anything happened to me that I would be on the phone to
my Congressman, that some newspaper would love to cover
it, and somebody would testify about it. So I think that
the tribes are probably more aware and sensitive to the
rights of non-members who are residents of the reservation
than other communities where there might be some analo78
gies.
As Deloria indicated, ensuring the franchise is of little value to minority
groups who are grossly underrepresented in the community. A Native
73. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
74. Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137 (current version at 25
U.S.C. § 177 (1988)).
75. See supra note 40.
76. General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §
331 (1988)).
77. See generally S. James Anaya, -The Rights of Indigenous Peoples and International Law in Historical and Contemporary Perspective (1989) (symposium paper), in
1989 HAxvARD INDIAN LAW Sym'osrum 191 (Harvard Law School Publications Center
1990), reprinted in ROBERT M. CLINTON, NELL J. NEWTON & MONROE E. PRcE,
AmmucAN INDIAN LAW 1257 (3d ed. 1991).
78. Senate Duro Hearings, supra note 35, pt. 2, at 27 (statement of Sam Deloria).
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American's ability to vote in Albuquerque, where the Indian population
is quite small (although certainly greater than most other American
cities), does not give her any clout in the local government. Deloria's
residence as a nonmember on an Indian reservation, however, gave
him political clout even though he could not vote.
Moreover, Indian nonmembers who reside on a reservation have ties
with the reservation community: ties of marriage, kinship, and friendship, and ties based on working for tribal or federal organizations.
Tribes do not and simply cannot afford to mistreat nonmember residents. If there is any evidence that these people would prefer to go
before a state or federal court rather than a tribal court if they were
ever accused of a misdemeanor, I have not heard it.
Conclusion
In short, the Court should uphold the Duro-correction as within
Congress's power to set the contours of the federal-Indian relationship.
The Court has deferred to congressional power over Indian affairs for
over two hundred years. It would be shameful for the Court to stop
now that Congress has begun taking positive steps to help Indian
Country.
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